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NOTE
Humanizing the Corporation While Dehumanizing
the Individual: The Misuse of Deferred-Prosecution
Agreements in the United States
Andrea Amulic*
American prosecutors routinely offer deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution
agreements to corporate defendants, but not to noncorporate defendants. The
drafters of the Speedy Trial Act expressly contemplated such agreements, as
originally developed for use in cases involving low-level, nonviolent,
noncorporate defendants. This Note posits that the almost exclusive use of
deferrals in corporate cases is inconsistent with the goal that these agreements
initially sought to serve. The Note further argues that this exclusivity can be
attributed to prosecutors’ tendency to only consider collateral consequences in
corporate cases and not in noncorporate cases. Ultimately, this Note recom-
mends that prosecutors evaluate collateral fallout when deciding whether to
prosecute noncorporate, as well as corporate, defendants and that the Depart-
ment of Justice adopt departmental guidelines to ensure compliance with this
goal.
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Introduction
Criminal convictions have devastating effects on the lives of convicted
defendants long after incarceration. The United States has the highest rate of
incarceration in the world, with 1 in 100 adults currently in jail or prison.1
This rate has increased dramatically in the past forty years—the federal
prison population has more than quadrupled in the past thirty-five years.2 In
addition to punishment by incarceration, convicted defendants in the
United States also suffer a wide variety of collateral consequences that take
effect upon conviction or release, such as disenfranchisement and restric-
tions on employment.3 Unlike direct consequences, collateral consequences
are not imposed at sentencing but instead by regulations, laws, or policies
that a conviction triggers.4 Communities with high rates of incarceration are
harmed by the removal of individuals from these communities, as well as the
limitations on reintegration that collateral consequences impose upon their
release.5
The increased use of deferred-prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) and
nonprosecution agreements (“NPAs”) may mitigate the harmful effects of
criminal convictions. A DPA is an agreement through which a prosecutor
agrees to defer a defendant’s prosecution for a period of time on the condi-
tion that the defendant fulfill a set of requirements over that period of time.6
The prosecutor files criminal charges against the defendant but does not
actually investigate or try the case unless the defendant breaches the terms of
the agreement.7 If the defendant successfully completes the requirements,
the charges are dropped.8 An NPA, on the other hand, does not involve filing
1. See, e.g., Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 Hastings L.J. 423, 428
(2013).
2. See Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass
Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 117, 127 (2014) (citing Statis-
tics, Fed. Bureau Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp
[https://perma.cc/9RKB-KDH2]).
3. See generally National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction (“NICCC”),
Council St. Gov’ts, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/map/ [https://perma.cc/HC9U-
GQNW] [hereinafter NICCC].
4. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 Minn. L.
Rev. 670, 678 (2008).
5. See Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local Concentra-
tion of Mass Incarceration, 139 Daedalus 20, 29 (2010).
6. See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact
on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 Hastings L.J. 1293, 1299–300
(2014).
7. See id.
8. Id.
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formal charges against a defendant at the outset. Instead, the prosecutor
agrees not to file charges at all, as long as the defendant complies with the
agreement’s terms.9 This Note will focus on deferred-prosecution agree-
ments, but similar concerns apply to both types of agreements.
Deferral programs initially arose from a desire to protect vulnerable
members of society from the stigma of criminal prosecutions.10 In the mid-
and late 1900s, prosecutors deferred prosecutions of nonviolent, low-level
offenders in order to mitigate the harmful collateral effects of convictions.11
The theory behind deferrals is both utilitarian and rehabilitative.12 Individu-
als who have criminal convictions may, for example, have a hard time find-
ing employment upon release and might consequently be more likely to
recidivate—a deferral, on the other hand, gives a defendant a second
chance.13 Recently, however, leniency for low-level offenders has not been
the norm.14 Since the early 2000s, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
entered into several hundred DPAs and NPAs with corporate defendants,15
but virtually none with noncorporate individuals.16 Senator Elizabeth War-
ren has noted the irony in offering such agreements to corporate defendants
almost exclusively, stating:
If you’re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re
gonna go to jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the rest of
your life . . . . But evidently if you launder nearly a billion dollars for drug
cartels and violate our international sanctions, your company pays a fine
and you go home and sleep in your bed at night.17
9. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1789,
1799–800 (2015).
10. E.g., Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experi-
ment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 307, 314.
11. Id.
12. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1295, 1305–06 (2013).
13. Id. at 1305.
14. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101
Va. L. Rev. Online 60, 62–63 (2015), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawre
view.org/files/Garrett_final_publish.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JKW-WMV7] (“[F]or years, par-
ticularly under Attorney General John Ashcroft, the DOJ policy was the opposite of lenient,
encouraging prosecutors to pursue the ‘most serious, readily provable’ charges against individ-
uals.” (quoting Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/
03_ag_516.htm [https://perma.cc/P9U6-NA8B]).
15. Garrett, supra note 9, at 1791.
16. See, e.g., Michael L. Siegel, White Collar Crime: Law, Procedure, Theory,
Practice 443 (2011) (“As a general rule, there is no method of dealing with street criminals
other than prosecution. They either face criminal charges or go free.”).
17. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1321–22 (quoting Mark Gongloff, Elizabeth War-
ren: Banks Get Wrist Slaps While Drug Dealers Get Jail, Huffington Post (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:19
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/07/elizabeth-warren-hsbc-money-laundering_n
_2830166.html [https://perma.cc/FP4E-2Q9E]).
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By offering deferrals to only corporate offenders, the DOJ is expressing a
great deal of inconsistency regarding how it views corporate and
noncorporate defendants in our criminal justice system.
A federal judge recently drew attention to this inconsistent treatment in
an opinion that advocated for a reform of the practice of granting deferrals
exclusively to corporations. On October 21, 2015, Judge Emmett Sullivan
approved the use of deferred-prosecution agreements in a corporate case.18
He did not exclusively consider collateral consequences but noted that this
consideration was one useful factor in evaluating the agreements.19 Judges
have routinely approved deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution agree-
ments for corporate defendants in recent years, so Judge Sullivan’s decision
to do so in this case was not remarkable. But his inclusion of an additional
part to the opinion arguing, in dicta, that “the current use of deferred-pros-
ecution agreements for corporations rather than individual defendants
strays from Congress’s intent when it created an exclusion from the speedy
trial calculation for the use of such agreements”20 drew some attention.21 In
this part, Judge Sullivan repeatedly expressed disappointment that DPAs and
similar tools are not being used to avoid subjecting noncorporate defendants
to the “devastating collateral consequences of . . . criminal conviction[s].”22
Although a great deal has been written recently about the use of DPAs and
NPAs in the corporate criminal context, and it is virtually uncontested that
these agreements were developed for use in noncorporate prosecutions,23 the
literature exploring the derailment of this goal is sparse.
In order to adhere to the promise of justice, actors within the system
should treat all defendants with humanity. Treating defendants with human-
ity requires considering the impact that convictions will have on their lives
beyond incarceration, particularly through collateral consequences.24 Cur-
rently, prosecutors treat corporate defendants as human and explicitly con-
sider the human fallout attendant with corporate convictions when deciding
whether to defer corporate prosecutions.25 Meanwhile, however, they treat
18. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2015).
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 37.
21. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Judge Laments Imbalance in Criminal Justice System, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 2015, at A15 (“While it is not uncommon for judges to criticize outcomes that
they see as unjust, it is highly unusual for them to so explicitly advocate—and at such great
length—a change in approach.”).
22. Saena Tech, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 42.
23. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 10, at 314; Gordon Bourjaily, Note, DPA DOA: How and
Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate
Criminal Prosecutions, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 543, 544 (2015).
24. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Is-
sues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 522 (2010) (arguing that collateral conse-
quences “seriously infringe upon the dignity interests of those with criminal records” in the
United States).
25. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-28.1100
(2015) [hereinafter USAM], https://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual
[https://perma.cc/M5ZE-ZS8T] (“Prosecutors may consider the collateral consequences of a
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noncorporate defendants as instruments of crime and fail to consider the
human fallout of convictions on noncorporate defendants.26 This inconsis-
tent treatment should end. Although the potential collateral consequences of
corporate convictions are certainly destructive, so are the collateral conse-
quences of noncorporate convictions. These consequences must be consid-
ered in choosing whether to prosecute noncorporate, as well as corporate,
defendants.
This Note argues that prosecutors should treat noncorporate defend-
ants27 with humanity and consider collateral consequences in offering DPAs
and NPAs in the same way they do with corporate defendants. Part I con-
tends that, while DPAs and NPAs arose to address prosecutions for low-level,
nonviolent offenses, they have been used much more frequently in the cor-
porate context, particularly in recent years. Part II argues that, since collat-
eral consequences are explicitly considered in corporate prosecutions,
prosecutorial failure to consider collateral consequences in noncorporate
criminal prosecutions is inappropriate because it results in prosecutors hu-
manizing corporations but dehumanizing individuals. Part III recommends
that prosecutors regularly consider offering DPAs and NPAs to noncorporate
offenders and explicitly evaluate collateral consequences when making such
decisions.28
I. DPAs and NPAs Were Designed for Use in Noncorporate Cases
In the early 1900s, prosecutors used deferred-prosecution agreements in
dealing with low-level, nonviolent individuals, especially juveniles and first-
time offenders.29 This application of DPAs and NPAs has declined, however,
and the use of DPAs and NPAs in the corporate context has skyrocketed over
the past two decades.30 This Part details the shift from the initial uses of such
agreements in the noncorporate context to the corporate context. Section
I.A reviews the mechanics of DPAs and NPAs and analyzes the Speedy Trial
Act in the context of the original use of deferrals. Section I.B explains that,
in recent years, prosecutors have offered DPAs and NPAs almost exclusively
to corporate offenders.
corporate criminal conviction or indictment in determining whether to charge the corporation
with a criminal offense and how to resolve corporate criminal cases.”).
26. See id. §§ 9-22.000 to .200.
27. Although DPAs and NPAs are available for misdemeanor cases, see, e.g., id. § 9-
22.010, this Note considers the use of DPAs and NPAs in felony prosecutions only.
28. This Note does not contend that the use of DPAs and NPAs in corporate criminal
cases is inappropriate or improper, but rather that the use of these agreements should not be
exclusive to the corporate context.
29. E.g., Reilly, supra note 10, at 314–15; Bourjaily, supra note 23, at 544.
30. See Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1309–10 (“From 1994 to 2001, the DOJ
resolved only seven corporate criminal cases via DPAs. Since then, the DOJ has entered into
over 250 DPAs, with 100 executed between 2010 and 2012 alone.” (footnote omitted)).
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A. DPAs, NPAs, and the Speedy Trial Act
Deferrals were initially offered exclusively to noncorporate individuals,
as Congress expressly contemplated when drafting the Speedy Trial Act. The
Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant pleading not guilty be brought to
trial within seventy days.31 The Act provides an exception from the seventy-
day timeline for “[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred
by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the
defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”32 This provision in the Speedy
Trial Act reflects the original purpose for which deferrals were initially
developed.33
In the early and mid-twentieth century, prosecutors offered deferred-
prosecution agreements to low-level offenders, rather than charging them
for minor offenses.34 Prosecutors were thus able to avoid “placing young,
non-violent offenders on the track of traditional criminal adjudication—
and thus inflicting on them the stigma of a criminal conviction . . . .”35
Deferred-prosecution agreements instead allowed defendants to demon-
strate that they had reformed and were therefore no longer deserving of
traditional criminal punishment.36 Deferrals were usually targeted at low-
level, nonviolent offenders, with the hope of allowing those offenders to
avoid “the potentially lifelong collateral consequences of a felony convic-
tion.”37 These agreements created the additional benefit of increasing judi-
cial efficiency by reducing the total number of cases actually tried.38
Ultimately, proponents of deferrals and diversion programs expected that
these arrangements would greatly benefit society at large.
Evidence suggests that deferrals and diversion programs do benefit soci-
ety. Diversion programs, such as the Manhattan Court Employment Project
in New York City (“MCEP”) and Project Crossroads in Washington, D.C.,
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012).
32. Id. § 3161(h)(2).
33. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 10, at 314–15; Bourjaily, supra note 23, at 544.
34. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863, 1866
(2005).
35. Bourjaily, supra note 23, at 544.
36. Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context
of Iranian Sanctions, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 631, 643 (2014) (“In order to
be granted a deferral, the offender first makes an admission of guilt and waives the right to a
speedy trial. Then, in exchange for being criminally charged, the offender commits to rehabili-
tation and when necessary, pays restitution to the victims. The offender then agrees to abide
by terms that the prosecution sets, which always include a deferral period. At the end of the
period, if the offender has followed the terms, the prosecutor may dismiss the indictment.”).
37. Greenblum, supra note 34, at 1866.
38. Id.
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were developed as diversion programs for eligible defendants.39 The MCEP
limited eligibility to men who were between seventeen and forty-five years
old, resided in New York City, were unemployed, had no more than one
additional pending charge, had not served more than six months in prison,
were not suffering from addiction, and had not been charged with certain
crimes.40 Project Crossroads required that participants be between sixteen
and twenty-six years old; have no prior convictions; be unemployed, under-
employed, or enrolled in school; and have been charged with “a crime spe-
cifically defined and accepted by both the court and the project.”41 These
programs likely limited eligibility to young, nonviolent, unemployed offend-
ers in order to effectively limit their scope and minimize political backlash
against the idea of offering alternative dispositions. This Note does not advo-
cate for indiscriminately offering deferrals to all criminal defendants, but
neither does it envision as narrow an application as the MCEP and Project
Crossroads utilized.
Both the MCEP and Project Crossroads were successful in achieving
their goals of increasing employment rates and decreasing recidivism rates
among participants who had been favorably terminated (meaning that they
had successfully completed the programs). A staggering majority of MCEP
participants were employed at dismissal each year.42 Project Crossroads
found that “approximately 60% of those favorably terminated were em-
ployed for more than four-fifths of the year following termination,” as com-
pared to only 23% of those unfavorably terminated.43 In the first two years
of the MCEP’s implementation, the recidivism rate (measured by rearrest)
39. Criminal Justice Coordination Council & Vera Inst. of Justice, The Man-
hattan Court Employment Project 1 (1970) (“[The MCEP] offers [a defendant] counsel-
ing and job opportunities and, if he cooperates and appears to show promise of permanent
change, recommends that the prosecutor (district attorney) and the judge dismiss the charges
against him without ever deciding whether he is guilty.”); Roberta Rovner-Pieczenik, Nat’l
Comm. for Children & Youth, Project Crossroads as Pre-Trial Intervention: A Pro-
gram Evaluation 1–2 (1970) (“The court, in supporting this endeavor, agreed to consider a
‘nol pros’ of the charges pending against any project participant who was terminated with a
favorable recommendation by the project after the successful completion of the three-month
program.”).
40. Criminal Justice Coord. Council & Vera Inst. of Justice, supra note 39, at 3
(explaining that defendants were ineligible if they had been charged with “crimes of extreme
gravity, such as homicide, armed robbery, forcible rape, or arson[, or] crimes indicating a
lucrative illegal occupation, such as gambling or numbers running[, or] crimes indicating a
problem beyond the Project’s capability, such as drug addiction or alcoholism”).
41. Rovner-Pieczenik, supra note 39, at 1.
42. See Vera Inst. of Justice, Pre-Trial Intervention: The Manhattan Court Em-
ployment Project of the Vera Institute of Justice Final Report 7 (1972) (noting that
91.4% of participants were employed at dismissal in the first year, 95.4% were employed at
dismissal in the second year, and 79.3% were employed at dismissal in the third year). The
drop in employment in the third year may be attributed to an increase in the number of
students participating in the program, or a change in the minimum wage law. Id. at 8.
43. Rovner-Pieczenik, supra note 39, at 12.
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for successful participants was half that of unsuccessful participants,44 and in
the third year, it was only 2.9%.45 The combined recidivism rate for all Pro-
ject Crossroads participants, whether favorably or unfavorably terminated,
was 14% lower than that of the control group.46 The success of these pro-
grams in improving outcomes for their participants suggests that deferrals
can be effective in nonviolent criminal cases.
Congress specifically considered the successes of these programs in
drafting the Speedy Trial Act. Congress expressed a desire “to encourage the
current trend among United States attorneys to allow for deferral of prose-
cution on the condition of good behavior.”47 A Senate committee report
regarding 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), the provision that allows for exclusion of
time pursuant to a deferral agreement, mentions both the MCEP and Pro-
ject Crossroads, noting that “[s]uch diversion programs have been quite suc-
cessful with first offenders.”48 These programs illustrated the benefits of
alternative dispositions.49 The report further notes that the provision al-
lowing for exclusion of time is necessary because without it, “prosecutors
would never agree to such diversion programs.”50 By drawing upon MCEP
and Project Crossroads in support of § 3161(h)(2), Congress expressed sup-
port for alternative dispositions and hoped that prosecutors would continue
to utilize deferrals and diversion programs in dispensing with cases that in-
volved low-level, nonviolent offenders. Although the consideration of legis-
lative history in interpreting statutory provisions is often controversial,51
arguments against such consideration usually hinge on the difficulty of as-
certaining intent from the Congressional Record.52 In the case of this provi-
sion, however, that argument is inapplicable—the Senate report clearly
communicated that a goal of drafting § 3161(h)(2) was to encourage prose-
cutors to offer deferrals to nonviolent offenders.
44. Vera Inst. of Justice, supra note 42, at 12 (noting that the recidivism rate is 15.8%
for favorably terminated participants, as compared to 30.8% for unfavorably terminated
participants).
45. Id. at 10.
46. Rovner-Pieczenik, supra note 39, at 17 (describing the overall recidivism rates
(measured by rearrests) for participants within fifteen months of initial arrest as follows:
20.13% for the favorably terminated group (n=149), 56.65% for the unfavorably terminated
group (n=51), and 43.36% for the control group (n=107)).
47. Anthony Partridge, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Legislative History of Title I of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 117 (1980).
48. Id.
49. See Rovner-Pieczenik, supra note 39, at 12, 17; Vera Inst. of Justice, supra note
42, at 7.
50. Partridge, supra note 47, at 117.
51. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 845–46 (1992) (addressing various criticisms of legislative history).
52. Id. at 854–55 (describing a helpful consideration of the legislative history of a federal
bankruptcy statute in order to ascertain the purpose of an amendment).
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The text of the Speedy Trial Act further supports a reading that Con-
gress contemplated deferral agreements with noncorporate individuals in
mind. The Act states:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in com-
puting the time within which the trial of any such offense must com-
mence . . . Any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the
attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the de-
fendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.53
Congress did not limit the scope of the Act to corporate defendants—rather,
it is more likely that this provision was meant to apply to individual actors
and not corporations. As a matter of grammar, the use of the singular noun
“defendant” and the singular possessive pronoun “his” suggest that Congress
meant for this provision to apply to individual defendants not acting on
behalf of corporations.54 The historic use of deferrals, along with the legisla-
tive history and text of the Speedy Trial Act, all indicate that Congress in-
tended for prosecutors to offer deferrals to noncorporate defendants.
B. Recent Use of DPAs and NPAs in Corporate Cases
Scholars agree that the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen
in the early 2000s sparked the routine use of DPAs and NPAs with respect to
corporate crimes.55 Andersen was convicted for obstructing an SEC investi-
gation related to the Enron scandal.56 The company ceased its operations
after losing its audit license as a collateral consequence of the conviction,
leaving 28,000 employees without jobs.57 The loss of the audit license can be
considered a direct collateral consequence, because the SEC affirmatively
imposes this penalty on convicted felons.58 The subsequent collapse of the
company, on the other hand, was an indirect consequence, as it resulted
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
54. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodologi-
cal Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1763 (2010) (explaining
that textualist interpretations of statutes depend on definitions, textual context, and “default
presumptions based on common rules of grammar and word usage”).
55. E.g., Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1306; Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on
Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreement, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1434, 1436
(2007).
56. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S.
696 (2005). Ironically, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction a year later. Arthur Ander-
sen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
57. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1307.
58. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(2)–(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(2) to (3)
(2012).
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from the imposition of the audit restriction.59 Both sets of consequences
were devastating to the company,60 and the increased use of DPAs and NPAs
since the company’s demise is widely seen as an attempt to avoid a repeat of
the “Andersen effect.”61
Although deferrals were used in noncorporate cases against individuals
in the early and mid-twentieth century, prosecutors began to consider offer-
ing similar agreements to corporate defendants in the later part of the cen-
tury. The E.F. Hutton and Drexel Burnham Lambert cases in the late 1980s
indicated that alternatives to prosecution could benefit corporations as well
as individuals. Hutton had been charged with mail and wire fraud; after
pleading guilty, the company “was drastically weakened and forced to merge
with a competitor.”62 Drexel pleaded guilty to securities fraud charges, after
which the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.63 These instances of
corporate collapse following conviction inspired prosecutors to consider al-
ternatives to charging corporations criminally.64 Several years later, the DOJ
investigated Salomon Brothers for violations of the False Claims Act.65 In-
stead of prosecuting the company, however, prosecutors offered Salomon an
NPA in exchange for several conditions, including the payment of fines, for-
feiture, and victim compensation; cooperation with investigators; and im-
plementation of compliance procedures.66 Notably, the then U.S. attorney
for the Southern District of New York specifically referenced a desire to
avoid collateral consequences—among other factors—in justifying the of-
fice’s decision not to prosecute Salomon.67
Prosecutors did not begin offering deferred-prosecution and nonp-
rosecution agreements to corporate defendants immediately after the Salo-
mon case. In fact, the DOJ only entered into seven DPAs between 1994 and
2001.68 After the Andersen conviction, however, the use of DPAs increased—
“[s]ince [2001], the DOJ has entered into over 250 DPAs, with 100 executed
between 2010 and 2012 alone.”69 In 2009, the Government Accountability
59. See Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1307 (“After the grand jury issued the indict-
ment, the firm could no longer audit public companies. Andersen folded, and with it 28,000
employees lost their jobs.”).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 1296.
62. Id. at 1301–02.
63. Id. at 1302.
64. Id. (“These cases contributed to the general perception that a criminal conviction
was not the preferred means of rehabilitating a corporation and achieving maximum
deterrence.”).
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Mil-
lion Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case (May 20, 1992), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.htm [https://perma.cc/AH27-
2WPQ].
66. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1302.
67. Id. at 1302–03.
68. Id. at 1309–10.
69. Id. at 1310 (footnote omitted).
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Office (“GAO”) conducted a study of the use of DPAs and NPAs in corpo-
rate prosecutions and found that, between 2004 and 2009, U.S. Attorneys’
Offices (“USAOs”) entered into ninety-four DPAs and NPAs with corporate
defendants and pursued 1,659 corporate prosecutions.70 The GAO also
found that the Criminal Division of the DOJ had entered into forty-four
corporate DPAs and NPAs, as compared to thirty-eight prosecutions.71
While these numbers do not account for the past seven years, they do indi-
cate a growth in the use of alternative dispositions in corporate cases since
the late twentieth century. The GAO report makes much of the fact that
USAOs pursued seventeen times as many corporate prosecutions as deferrals
from 2004 to 2009,72 but this statistic does not sufficiently address the fact
that USAOs disproportionately offer deferrals to corporate, as compared to
noncorporate, defendants.
The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act confirms that Congress
intended to make DPAs and NPAs available to noncorporate actors. As
noted above, the relevant Senate committee report states that the goal of
§ 3161(h)(2) was to encourage deferrals conditioned on good behavior and
references diversion programs targeted at individual offenders.73 Nothing in
the legislative record indicates that Congress contemplated that these agree-
ments would be offered to corporations at all, let alone exclusively. Instead,
the shift away from using DPAs and NPAs in noncorporate prosecutions has
tracked the historical shift toward being tough on crime that characterized
the late 1900s, with the enactment of mandatory minimums, three-strikes
laws, and harsh sentencing guidelines.74 Although the use of DPAs and NPAs
in corporate cases has likely been helpful in avoiding large-scale economic
fallout of the Andersen magnitude in recent years, there is no reason to limit
the use of these agreements to corporate defendants. Instead, prosecutors
should give similar considerations to the collateral consequences attendant
70. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, Corporate Crime: DOJ Has
Taken Steps to Better Track its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should
Evaluate Effectiveness 16 tbl.1 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V6RP-4P56].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 14, 16 tbl.1 (“The number of DPAs and NPAs entered into by the USAOs is
small compared to the number of corporate prosecutions they pursued.”).
73. Partridge, supra note 47, at 117 (“A number of Federal and State courts have been
experimenting with pretrial diversion or intervention programs in which prosecution of a
certain category of defendants is held in abeyance on the condition that the defendant partici-
pate in a social rehabilitation program. If the defendant succeeds in the program, charges are
dropped. Such diversion programs have been quite successful with first offenders in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Project Crossroads) and in New York City (Manhattan Court Employment Project).
Some success has also been noted in programs where the defendant’s alleged criminality is
related to a specific social problem such as prostitution or heroin addiction.”).
74. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 How. L.J. 753, 770–71 (2011) (as-
serting that, in the late 1900s, “[d]eferred adjudication laws enacted in the 1970s, whose pur-
pose was to enable certain defendants to avoid a conviction record, were overridden”).
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with convicting noncorporate defendants, and consideration of such conse-
quences should thus inform decisions to prosecute or defer these cases as
well.
II. Prosecutors Humanize Corporations but
Dehumanize Individuals
Prosecutorial treatment of collateral consequences exemplifies the fail-
ure of the criminal justice system to recognize the humanity of defendants.
While collateral consequences accompany convictions in both corporate and
noncorporate criminal cases, prosecutors only consider the effects of these
consequences in the corporate context. This Part explores the ways in which
prosecutors consider collateral consequences. Section II.A presents the dis-
parate ways prosecutors evaluate collateral consequences in corporate and
noncorporate cases. Section II.B contends that imposing collateral conse-
quences requires that prosecutors treat offenders with some level of human-
ity, and that prosecutors do not consider the collateral consequences of
convicting noncorporate defendants in order to avoid humanizing them. In
contrast, the fiction of corporate personhood encourages a legal understand-
ing of corporations as quasi-human. The explicit consideration of collateral
consequences with respect to corporate DPAs and NPAs, but not for
noncorporate defendants, reflects this difference.
A. Prosecutors Consider Collateral Consequences for
Corporate Defendants Exclusively
Prosecutors are uncharacteristically transparent with respect to the fac-
tors that they consider in evaluating corporate crimes. The public therefore
has a great deal of information regarding why prosecutors decide to prose-
cute or not prosecute corporations: “In few areas of criminal law do prose-
cutors announce in advance, and in detail, under what circumstances they
will prosecute versus offer outright leniency.”75 The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
explicitly recommends that prosecutors consider collateral consequences
when deciding whether to prosecute corporate defendants.76 Within the
manual, the “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”
suggest that prosecutors consider ten factors when deciding whether to
charge corporations.77 “These factors broadly focus[ ] on the seriousness of
the past conduct at the firm, the firm’s present cooperation, reporting and
75. Garrett, supra note 14, at 62.
76. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-28.1100 (“Prosecutors may consider the collateral conse-
quences of a corporate criminal conviction or indictment in determining whether to charge
the corporation with a criminal offense and how to resolve corporate criminal cases.”).
77. Id. § 9-28.300 (listing, as a factor, “collateral consequences, including whether there
is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven
personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution”).
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compliance at the firm, and future consequences, including collateral conse-
quences, for the firm and others should the company be prosecuted.”78
Although the manual explicitly contemplates collateral consequences in
corporate cases, it fails to consider these consequences in noncorporate
cases. The section regarding noncorporate deferrals does not even mention
collateral consequences.79 Instead, it frames eligibility for deferral programs
in terms of types of crimes committed and offenders’ prior convictions.80
The consideration of collateral consequences plays a significant role in
prosecutorial decisions to offer DPAs and NPAs to corporations but not to
noncorporate actors.
1. Collateral Consequences of Corporate Convictions
The collateral consequences associated with convicting corporate actors
are often referred to in the literature as a “corporate death penalty.”81 Such
consequences include direct regulatory restrictions, such as debarment,82
loss of good standing, and loss of professional (e.g., banking, audit) li-
censes.83 The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual instructs prosecutors to account for
these consequences.84 These direct sanctions may in turn lead to indirect
third-party effects, including loss of jobs, shareholders’ losses, forced merg-
ers, and even bankruptcy.85 Both direct and indirect collateral consequences
of corporate convictions can be extremely serious.
Corporations might also face administrative debarment upon convic-
tion.86 Administrative debarments are collateral to convictions because they
are imposed by agencies, not judges. The Federal Acquisition Regulations
(“FAR”) govern business transactions between federal agencies and busi-
nesses87 and seek to ensure that the government only conduct business with
78. Garrett, supra note 14, at 64.
79. See USAM, supra note 25, §§ 9-22.000 to .200.
80. Id. § 9-22.100.
81. E.g., Reilly, supra note 10, at 321–22; Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Re-
thinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 426 (2007).
82. Reilly, supra note 10, at 320.
83. See, e.g., Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1320 (quoting then–Assistant Attorney
General Lanny Breuer in asserting that, “had prosecutors pursued criminal sanctions against
HSBC, it ‘would almost certainly have lost its banking license in the U.S.’ ”).
84. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-28.1100 (“Prosecutors should also be aware of non-penal
sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension or debarment
from eligibility for government contracts or federally funded programs such as health care
programs.”).
85. E.g., Reilly, supra note 10, at 323 (“[U]nfortunately, it is not only the irresponsible
business partners that are impacted when a company is debarred. Numerous other parties face
collateral consequences, including employees, stockholders, and, of course, customers who rely
on the products and services produced or provided by these businesses.”).
86. Id. at 320–21.
87. See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.000–.707 (2016).
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responsible companies88 in order to “maintain[ ] the public’s trust and ful-
fill[ ] public policy objectives.”89 Pursuant to the FAR, a federal agency can,
at its discretion, debar a convicted corporation if such action is in the public
interest.90 A debarred or suspended company is excluded from receiving new
contracts from federal agencies directly and from dealing with the govern-
ment as agents or representatives on behalf of other companies.91 Any ex-
isting contracts that these companies have with federal agencies are subject
to further regulations and may even be terminated at the discretion of
agency heads.92 Since many companies depend on contracts with federal
agencies for revenue,93 debarments may impose very serious consequences.
Statutory debarments operate in a similar fashion to exclude convicted
companies from contracting with federal agencies. Particular statutes, such
as the Clean Air Act94 and the Clean Water Act,95 mandate that corporations
convicted under these statutes lose their government contracts.96 These sanc-
tions operate to prevent companies “from entering new contracts with the
88. Id. § 9.402.
89. Id. § 1.102(a).
90. Reilly, supra note 10, at 320–21.
91. 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a).
92. Id. § 9.405-1.
93. See Reilly, supra note 10, at 321 (noting that, in fiscal year 2013, the U.S. government
spent an estimated $460 billion on goods and services, thus making it the largest purchaser of
goods and services in the world). See generally Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year
2015 Budget of the U.S. Government (2015) (allocating approximately $23.7 billion to the
Department of Agriculture, $8.8 billion to the Department of Commerce, $495.6 billion to the
Department of Defense, $45.6 billion to the National Intelligence Program, $68.6 billion to the
Department of Education, $27.9 billion to the Department of Energy, $77.1 billion to the
Department of Health and Human Services, $38.2 billion to the Department of Homeland
Security, $46.7 billion to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, $12 billion to
the Department of the Interior, $11.8 billion to the Department of Labor, $91 billion to the
Department of Transportation, $7.9 billion to the Environmental Protection Agency, $17.5
billion to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, $7.3 billion to the National
Science Foundation, and $710 million for the Small Business Administration).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (2012) (“No federal agency may enter into any contract with any
person who is convicted of any offense under section 7413(c) of this title for the procurement
of goods, materials, and services to perform such contract at any facility at which the violation
which gave rise to such conviction occurred if such facility is owned, leased, or supervised by
such person. . . . The Administrator may extend this prohibition to other facilities owned or
operated by the convicted person.”).
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2012) (“No Federal agency may enter into any contract with
any person, who has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title, for the
procurement of goods, materials, and services if such contract is to be performed at any facil-
ity at which the violation which gave rise to such conviction occurred, and if such facility is
owned, leased, or supervised by such person. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall
continue until the Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has
been corrected.”).
96. Reilly, supra note 10, at 321.
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government until they address the conditions that gave rise to their convic-
tion[s],” which typically requires entry into compliance programs.97 Again,
such consequences could have drastic effects on convicted corporations:
“[I]f a company relies on government contracts as a source of projects and
profits, such statutory debarment could dramatically impact its bottom line,
if not put it out of business altogether.”98
Companies may also be unable to participate in certain federal pro-
grams if they have been convicted of crimes. Medicare and other health care
programs mandate exclusion for certain offenses, such as “(1) [c]onviction
of program-related crimes . . . (2) [c]onviction relating to patient abuse . . .
(3) [f]elony conviction relating to health care fraud . . . [and] (4) [f]elony
conviction relating to controlled substance.”99 These programs also allow for
discretionary exclusion for numerous less serious offenses, including misde-
meanor fraud or controlled substance convictions, failure to furnish medi-
cally necessary services, failure to disclose certain required information,
obstructing investigations, and making false statements or material misrep-
resentations.100 Businesses like hospitals, pharmacies, and other health care
providers depend on maintaining good business relationships with health
care programs in order to be able to serve their customers. Accordingly,
exclusion from these programs can be particularly harmful to those
companies.
Numerous indirect effects may emanate from corporate convictions due
to the imposition of regulatory or statutory collateral consequences. As pre-
viously noted, the United States is the largest purchaser of goods and ser-
vices in the world,101 and much of the national budget is divided among
various federal departments and agencies.102 If a company were to lose its
federal contracts, then, countless people could lose their jobs. In fact, in
order to justify offering DPAs and NPAs to corporations, prosecutors have
previously expressed fears that convictions may lead to widespread eco-
nomic trouble, as well as substantial harm to employees and shareholders.
The notion that corporations are “too big to jail” has been subject to a great
deal of backlash.103 For example, then–Assistant Attorney General Lanny
Breuer offered a DPA to HSBC despite “overwhelming evidence[ ] . . . and
97. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prose-
cution, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1235, 1258 (2016).
98. Reilly, supra note 10, at 321.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (“The Secretary shall exclude the following individuals and
entities from participation in any Federal health care program . . . .”).
100. Id. at § 1320a-7(b) (“The Secretary may exclude the following individuals and enti-
ties from participation in any Federal health care program . . . .”).
101. Reilly, supra note 10, at 321.
102. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 93.
103. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise
with Corporations (2014) (arguing that DPAs are often unsuccessful in reforming compa-
nies and advocating for improvements to the current practice of offering such agreements); Jed
S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied, N.Y. Rev. Books (Feb. 19, 2015), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied [https://perma.cc/
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HSBC’s own admission” that the company enabled drug cartels to launder
more than $800 million through a subsidiary and facilitated over $600 mil-
lion in transactions with countries that were subject to economic sanc-
tions.104 Breuer said that “[o]ur goal here is not to bring HSBC down, it’s
not to cause a systemic effect on the economy, it’s not for people to lose
thousands of jobs.”105 This statement “caused a firestorm of criticism” from
scholars and journalists.106 One report also noted that then–Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder claimed that “some financial institutions have become ‘so
large’ that it makes it ‘difficult for us to prosecute them.’ ”107 The DOJ has
since denied that it considers corporations beyond prosecution.108 But con-
cern about the human fallout of a corporate conviction has likely been at the
root of many decisions to defer corporate prosecutions.109
As discussed, the fear that a corporate conviction will lead to a major
economic collapse has been cited as the driving factor in the increased use of
DPAs and NPAs in the early 2000s. This fear, however, has lately been criti-
cized and, to some extent, debunked. Preet Bharara, the former U.S. attor-
ney for the Southern District of New York, has characterized concern about
the Andersen effect110 as overblown,111 and at least one study has shown no
such effect following the convictions of corporations between 2001 and
2010.112 Scholars have not yet studied this theory extensively. If the results of
84VN-8WBW] (providing a favorable review of Garrett’s book by a federal judge in the South-
ern District of New York).
104. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1295.
105. James O’Toole, HSBC: Too Big to Jail?, CNN: Money (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:08 PM), http:/
/money.cnn.com/2012/12/12/news/companies/hsbc-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/
9JBP-6Q2L].
106. See Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38; Peter J. Henning,
HSBC Case Tests Transparency of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. Times: DealBook
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/business/dealbook/hsbc-case-tests-trans-
parency-of-deferred-prosecution-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/K64J-43UE].
107. Danielle Douglas, Holder Concerned Megabanks Too Big to Jail, Wash. Post (Mar. 6,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concerned-megabanks-
too-big-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2b07a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9d_story.html [https://
perma.cc/X6DU-8YVB].
108. Aruna Viswanatha, DOJ: “There Is No Such Thing as Too Big to Jail”, Huffington
Post (May 5, 2014, 10:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/05/doj-too-big-to-
jail_n_5267238.html [https://perma.cc/D8PQ-BZ2X].
109. See, e.g., O’Toole, supra note 105.
110. The “Andersen effect” refers to the collapse of a corporation following an indict-
ment. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 1337–38.
112. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Cor-
porate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 797, 827 (2013)
(finding that, in the years 2001 to 2010, no publicly traded company failed due to a conviction,
and reporting “[n]o [e]vidence of an Andersen [e]ffect”). No evidence of effect, however, is
neither logically nor scientifically equivalent to evidence of no effect. See William Odita Tar-
now-Mordi & Michael JR Healy, Annotation, Distinguishing Between “No Evidence of Effect”
and “Evidence of No Effect” in Randomised Controlled Trials and Other Comparisons, 80
Archives Disease Childhood 210, 210–11 (1999).
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this study hold up, and if other actors in the system echo Mr. Bharara’s
sentiments, it is possible that federal prosecutors and the DOJ will begin to
offer fewer DPAs and NPAs to corporations in the future. Although this
Note does not advocate for fewer corporate deferrals, prosecutors should
offer DPAs and NPAs to more noncorporate defendants.
2. Collateral Consequences of Noncorporate Convictions
Noncorporate defendants may face a litany of collateral consequences,
in addition to incarceration, upon conviction. These consequences are col-
lateral because they are not included within the defendant’s judicially im-
posed sentence; instead, they are imposed by various laws and regulations.113
Some collateral consequences impact defendants’ economic livelihood,
others affect their families and personal lives, and others affect constitution-
ally protected rights.114 Ultimately, the imposition of collateral consequences
on a convicted defendant involves an intrusion into almost all aspects of his
life and therefore requires that he be treated with humanity—that is, with an
eye toward his existence in the world as a person.115
Upon release, former felons encounter economic hardship because it is
difficult for them to find employment.116 Not only are employers less likely
to hire applicants with criminal records,117 but former felons may be cate-
gorically restricted from certain types of occupations.118 Furthermore, they
may lose their business or trade licenses as a result of their convictions.119
Given the numerous and onerous restrictions on employment opportunities
for individuals with criminal convictions, it is hardly surprising that many
113. See generally NICCC, supra note 3. This database lists approximately 1,200 federal
collateral consequences, as compared to 46,000 state collateral consequences. Id. For ease of
comparison with corporate cases, this Note will focus on federal collateral consequences.
State-imposed collateral consequences greatly outnumber those imposed by federal statutes
and regulations, and should also be considered in evaluating the effects of convictions on
defendants’ lives.
114. See infra notes 116–137 and accompanying text.
115. See Humanity, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
humanity [https://perma.cc/E56V-VPVN].
116. E.g., Noah Remnick, Getting Fit, Prison-Style, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2016), http://mo
bile.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/nyregion/at-a-gym-in-manhattan-fitness-tips-from-ex-convicts.
html [https://perma.cc/NXU6-FQ2T] (“Forced to disclose his criminal history on applications,
Mr. Marte floundered in the job market. ‘The stigma was so strong it was like serving double
time.’ ”).
117. See, e.g., Soto v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 989 N.E.2d 1109, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013) (explaining that the employer could be liable for negligent hiring if it were charged with
sexual harassment for hiring an employee who had previously been disciplined for sexual
harassment, even though he did not have convictions on his record that technically disbarred
him).
118. E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 115.17 (2016) (prohibiting agencies from hiring individuals who
have been convicted of certain sex crimes for jobs involve direct contact with inmates).
119. E.g., 14 C.F.R. § 63.12 (2016) (noting that a conviction for a controlled substance
offense is grounds for the denial, suspension, or revocation of certification for non-crew
airmen).
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of them return to lives of crime upon release120 in order to pay their bills and
feed their families. Ironically, a criminal conviction will often render an in-
dividual ineligible for welfare, food stamps, Social Security, or other public
benefits.121 It may also preclude an individual’s eligibility for certain student
loans and grants.122 Financially, former criminal defendants have few op-
tions to rehabilitate their lives after conviction.
Convicted defendants may also face drastic consequences in their per-
sonal lives. They may be excluded or evicted from public housing on the
basis of certain convictions.123 Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, public hous-
ing authorities can evict entire families from public housing on the basis of a
single household member or guest engaging in drug-related activity.124 Con-
victed parents may also lose custody of their children,125 and individuals
with certain convictions are ineligible to foster or adopt children.126 Nonci-
tizens face deportation upon conviction of an “aggravated felony”—but this
category is not limited to federal felonies and may even include state misde-
meanors, such as drug crimes.127 Deportation is automatic, and defendants
often have little notice of the possibility that they may lose resident status if
they are found guilty of, or plead guilty to, many crimes.128 A criminal con-
viction can therefore severely and negatively impact almost every aspect of a
defendant’s life.
Furthermore, criminal defendants may be subjected to the deprivation
of certain constitutional rights after conviction, such as the rights to vote or
bear arms. The Supreme Court has clarified, for instance, that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms for individual citizens does not extend to
felons.129 In fact, federal law makes it illegal for any felon to possess a fire-
arm.130 In addition, individuals with felony convictions are prohibited from
120. See Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 244205, Recidivism
of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, at 1 (2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/UTH4-U535] (find-
ing that half of released prisoners were imprisoned again within five years).
121. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (excluding individuals with felony convictions from
receiving Social Security Act assistance or supplemental nutrition assistance).
122. E.g., I.R.C. § 25A (2012) (denying eligibility for a Hope Scholarship Credit to indi-
viduals who have been convicted of felony drug offenses).
123. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2016) (stating that a criminal conviction is grounds for ter-
mination of tenancy).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (2012).
125. E.g., id. § 5106a (limiting the custodial rights of parents who have been convicted of
certain crimes).
126. E.g., id. § 671(a)(20).
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
128. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2010) (finding counsel’s failure to
inform a client that he would be deported upon entering a guilty plea to constitute ineffective
assistance).
129. U.S. Const. amend. II; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). While a thorough analysis of felon-in-possession recid-
ivism is beyond the scope of this Note, it is notable that this law constitutes a possession
offense, which is easy to prove and difficult to challenge. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims
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exercising the right to vote in many jurisdictions.131 Although the Constitu-
tion does not expressly grant citizens the right to vote, several amendments
clarify the scope of this right, which courts have interpreted as fundamen-
tal.132 Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, states may
impose limits on this right for individuals with felony convictions.133 These
collateral consequences redefine the roles of convicted defendants in society
by making it impossible for them to regain their status as full citizens upon
release.
Scholars have challenged the definition of these consequences as collat-
eral, civil, and regulatory. They contend that, although these sanctions are
imposed on defendants outside of the sentencing scheme, they are inher-
ently punitive and should be considered as such.134 They have emphasized
that judges and legislatures might scrutinize collateral consequences more
closely if they were classified as punitive.135 A punitive classification would
render most of them—as they currently stand—unconstitutional violations
of the Ex Post Facto136 and Double Jeopardy137 Clauses. While this Note does
not advocate for such a definition, it agrees that collateral consequences
must be scrutinized more carefully—namely, by the prosecutors who ulti-
mately decide whether to subject defendants to the criminal process and,
eventually, to these collateral consequences.
B. The Consideration of Collateral Consequences Is Humanizing
Prosecutors should consider collateral consequences in deciding
whether to prosecute both corporate and noncorporate actors in order to
regard these defendants holistically with an understanding of their human
in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights 81 (2002) (describing a
possession offense as a “scheme, a means of surreptitiously expanding the reach of existing
criminal prohibitions, of transforming them into instruments of incapacitation”).
131. Despite this Note’s focus on federal collateral consequences, the discussion of disen-
franchisement must be conducted at the state level, since even federal elections are adminis-
tered differently by each state. Elections and Voting, White House, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/1600/elections-and-voting [https://perma.cc/G4ED-EEGG]. For a break-
down of felon disenfranchisement laws in all fifty states, see State Felon Voting Laws,
ProCon.org, http://felonvoting.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=286 [https://
perma.cc/CP5R-BAVH].
132. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–67 (1966).
133. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he
exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”).
134. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in Invisible
Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment 15, 16–17 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
135. Id.
136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting the imposition of a law with retroactive
effects).
137. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
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experiences and effects. The word “humanity” is defined simply as “the
quality or state of being human.”138 The United States is a nation founded
upon ideas of personhood and individuality,139 and its criminal justice sys-
tem should reflect these historical values. “Humanity is something that
needs to be articulated and, most important, to be recognized.”140 To recog-
nize an individual’s humanity is to understand the quality of his human
state—to comprehend his place in the world as a human. The consideration
of collateral consequences allows prosecutors to view defendants as humans,
not merely as instruments of crime, because these consequences intimately
impact all aspects of defendants’ lives beyond the imposition of fines or the
deprivation of liberty.141
When prosecutors have considered the human fallout that may result
from corporate convictions, they have declined to prosecute, opting instead
to enter into DPAs and NPAs with corporate defendants. The U.S. Attor-
neys’ Manual explicitly recommends that “where the collateral consequences
of a corporate conviction for innocent third parties would be significant, it
may be appropriate to consider a nonprosecution or deferred prosecution
agreement with conditions designed, among other things, to promote com-
pliance with applicable law and to prevent recidivism.”142 An oft-cited statis-
tic regarding the Andersen conviction is that it resulted in 28,000 employees
losing their jobs.143 Notably, however, “only five percent of Arthur Ander-
sen’s employees were responsible for the Enron misconduct.”144 As stated
above, Lanny Breuer, likely motivated by concern about a repeat of the An-
dersen effect, justified entering into a DPA with HSBC by suggesting that it
was necessary to avoid the loss of thousands of jobs.145 Evidently, when pros-
ecutors view corporations with an eye toward the human consequences of
convictions, they are willing to offer alternative dispositions.
The legal fiction of corporate personhood further encourages prosecu-
tors to humanize corporations. Corporations are legally treated as human in
138. See Humanity, supra note 115.
139. U.S. Const. pmbl. (“We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
140. Courtney R. Baker, Humane Insight: Looking at Images of African American
Suffering and Death 13 (2015).
141. Pinard, supra note 24, at 461 (discussing the “collective weight” of collateral conse-
quences and their “pernicious impact” on several aspects of the lives of individuals with crimi-
nal records).
142. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-28.1100.
143. E.g., Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1296.
144. Bourjaily, supra note 23, at 546.
145. See O’Toole, supra note 105.
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various respects.146 The legal fiction that a corporation is a person was nec-
essary to the development of criminal corporate liability.147 The idea of cor-
porate personhood may seem incompatible with the imposition of criminal
liability, particularly since a corporation cannot be incarcerated.148 The fic-
tion of corporate personhood, however, remains influential in the way cor-
porations are prosecuted, or not prosecuted. In fact, in his memorandum
regarding charging corporations, Eric Holder noted that, while prosecutors
should generally consider the same factors when dealing with corporate and
noncorporate defendants, “due to the nature of the corporate ‘person,’ some
additional factors are present” in corporate cases.149
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual does not similarly recommend that prose-
cutors consider the collateral consequences of convicting noncorporate de-
fendants. The section that addresses pretrial diversion programs does not
mention collateral consequences whatsoever. In fact, it states the goals of
pretrial diversion in remarkably impersonal terms: “To prevent future crimi-
nal activity among certain offenders . . . . To save prosecutive and judicial
resources . . . . To provide, where appropriate, a vehicle for restitution to
communities and victims of crime.”150 This language differs markedly from
the vivid language in the corporate section, which mentions “impact on in-
nocent third parties” and expressly contemplates the effect of a criminal
conviction on humans, namely “employees, investors, pensioners, and cus-
tomers.”151 Furthermore, the section of the Criminal Resource Manual that
discusses the Speedy Trial Act does not mention pretrial diversion programs,
or § 3161(h)(2), at all.152 Unlike corporate defendants, noncorporate de-
fendants are instrumentalized, not humanized, by federal prosecutors.
The likely justification for viewing noncorporate defendants as mere
conduits of criminal activity is that the act of subjecting a person to the
criminal process is made significantly easier when that person is not seen as
a person. If a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to a felony, he will
likely be incarcerated. In the land of the free, taking away a person’s freedom
is seen as an extremely serious consequence, and the Constitution guards
146. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law.”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (holding that corporate speech
is constitutionally protected and indicating that corporations are “citizens”).
147. Weissmann with Newman, supra note 81, at 418.
148. Id. at 428.
149. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF
[https://perma.cc/LY7K-BSZT].
150. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-22.010.
151. Id. § 9-28.1100.
152. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 628 [hereinafter Criminal
Resource Manual], https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual [https://
perma.cc/FU59-UZ6W].
144 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:123
heavily against improper liberty deprivation.153 The Due Process Clause
guarantees that the state may not deprive a person of life or liberty without
due process of law.154 Any attempt to see a defendant as an instrument of
crime, rather than a person that may potentially be subject to the depriva-
tion of liberty, is likely a reconciliation mechanism.155 Because a corporation
cannot be incarcerated, however, it is unnecessary to apply this kind of
framing to corporate defendants. While it is easy to forget that the conse-
quences of convicting an individual do not end with incarceration, the col-
lateral effects of convictions may be just as devastating.156 Prosecutors should
be encouraged to consider collateral consequences, and the effects that they
may have on convicted defendants’ entire lives, when deciding whether to
prosecute or divert them.
Some scholars are concerned that, in the corporate context, the individ-
uals who suffer most from the collateral consequences of criminal convic-
tions are usually the ones who have neither benefited from nor contributed
to the wrongdoing. They note that employees, shareholders, and customers
face negative consequences when companies are debarred.157 Alternatively,
the imposition of collateral consequences on noncorporate defendants is
seen as less troubling because they have actually been convicted of crimes.158
But the negative effects of convicting both corporate and noncorporate de-
fendants are felt widely, and they are not limited to the actors responsible
for the criminal activity.
153. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
154. Id.
155. Although this Note does not focus on criminal punishment and does not define
collateral consequences as punitive, it is helpful to note various philosophical theories of pun-
ishment in the context of instrumentalization. See, for example, Professor Noam Weiner’s
discussion:
Deontological retributivists critique consequentialist justifications for punishment by
pointing out that consequentialists instrumentalize the perpetrators of crimes by using
them as a means to achieve societal goals. Thus, a perpetrator sentenced severely to deter
others is not punished purely because of the wrongness of his actions, but is also made
into an instrument by the state for the deterrence of others who may commit crimes in
the future. Expressivists consider the punishment, and consequently the person being
punished, as a tool for expressing societal norms. Deontologists consider the humanity of
the perpetrator, and his free will, to be the very reason why he may be punished, and
therefore consider rationales that subject the free will to the good of others to be anath-
ema to criminal punishment.
Noam Wiener, Excuses, Justifications, and Duress at the International Criminal Tribunals, 26
Pace Int’l L. Rev. 88, 93 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
156. See supra Section II.A.2.
157. Reilly, supra note 10, at 323 (“[U]nfortunately, it is not only the irresponsible busi-
ness partners that are impacted when a company is debarred. Numerous other parties face
collateral consequences, including employees, stockholders, and, of course, customers who rely
on the products and services produced or provided by these companies.”).
158. See, e.g., Love, supra note 74, at 770–71 (noting that, following the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, the imposition of collateral consequences increased because “the official
position of the federal government was that criminals were to be labeled and segregated for the
protection of society, not reclaimed and forgiven”).
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These critics forget that collateral consequences do not only affect con-
victed individuals—they impact families and communities to a devastating
degree and contribute to the continued oppression of racial and economic
minorities. Child custody and public housing restrictions break up families,
harming individuals—often children—who have done nothing wrong.159
Furthermore, several states deny welfare benefits to individuals with felony
drug convictions,160 and individuals with convictions are ineligible for cer-
tain categories of employment.161 These conditions may drive individuals to
reoffend to make a living—high rates of conviction and incarceration para-
doxically harm communities rather than making them safer.162 This effect is
often racial.163 Given that black and Hispanic men are incarcerated at signifi-
cantly higher rates than white men in the United States, collateral conse-
quences of convictions disproportionately affect these populations164 and
contribute to an ongoing societal repression of racial minorities.165 Prosecu-
tors should therefore consider the far-reaching effects of criminal convic-
tions for noncorporate, as well as corporate, defendants.
III. Prosecutors Should Consider Collateral Consequences for
Noncorporate Defendants
Given the failures of the current prosecutorial framework, prosecutors
should change their approaches to offering deferrals to noncorporate de-
fendants. Ultimately, the decision to initiate, divert, or decline a prosecution
lies solely in the hands of the prosecutor.166 Although prosecutorial discre-
tion is subject to extrajudicial checks, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or
not prosecute a suspected offender is not reviewable.167 Prosecutors are
therefore uniquely positioned to effectuate a major reform in the way corpo-
rate and noncorporate prosecutions are disparately handled. This Part advo-
cates for a reform of the way prosecutors deal with noncorporate offenders.
Section III.A recommends that the DOJ adopt guidelines analogous to those
159. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2016).
160. Pinard, supra note 24, at 494.
161. Id. at 492.
162. See Traum, supra note 1, at 434 (“Paradoxically, more incarceration does not make
neighborhoods safer, and it may lead to higher crime and higher incarceration.”).
163. See John Edgar Wideman, Doing Time, Marking Race, Nation, Oct. 30, 1995, at 503,
505 (“[T]o be a man of color of a certain economic class and milieu is equivalent in the public
eye to being a criminal.”).
164. See Osler & Bennett, supra note 2, at 126–28.
165. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness 198 (2012) (“In the era of mass incarceration, what it means to be a
criminal in our collective consciousness has become conflated with what it means to be
black . . . .”).
166. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 61 (“[P]rosecutors simply have discretion to charge
corporations—or not . . . .”).
167. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 1, at 445.
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employed in corporate cases, requiring prosecutors to evaluate potential col-
lateral consequences when deciding whether to offer DPAs or NPAs to
noncorporate individuals. Section III.B considers alternative solutions that
may mitigate the devastating, far-reaching effects of collateral consequences
on noncorporate offenders in the event that prosecutors continue to limit
the use of DPAs and NPAs to corporate defendants.
A. Proposed DOJ Guidelines
Prosecutors should again adopt a practice of offering deferred-prosecu-
tion and nonprosecution agreements to individual, noncorporate offenders.
This policy is most consistent with historical practice, congressional intent,
and rehabilitative criminal justice goals. As discussed above, diversion pro-
grams implemented in New York City and Washington, D.C., in the mid-
twentieth century were successful in increasing employment rates and de-
creasing recidivism rates among young, nonviolent offenders.168 Further-
more, the Speedy Trial Act expressly contemplates pretrial diversion by
providing for the exclusion of time pursuant to diversion agreements, and
the Act does not limit its terms to corporate defendants only.169 In drafting
this section, Congress specifically considered the successes of the MCEP and
Project Crossroads and likely intended that prosecutors would utilize the
exclusion provision to continue deferring prosecution of low-level offend-
ers.170 While the recent use of DPAs and NPAs in corporate criminal cases
has likely been successful in avoiding another Andersen effect,171 the fact that
prosecutors have been offering these agreements to corporate defendants ex-
clusively deviates from the original purpose that they were designed to
serve.172
The DOJ should take active steps to remedy this deviation by updating
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to explicitly instruct prosecutors to consider col-
lateral consequences for noncorporate defendants. The manual most re-
cently underwent a significant revision in 1997, but that version of the
manual offered no guidance regarding corporate deferrals.173 Instead, the
only mention of pretrial diversions concerned noncorporate defendants.174
The sections dealing with corporate DPAs and NPAs were added in August
168. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
170. See Partridge, supra note 47, at 117.
171. See, e.g., Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1307.
172. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 37 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he
Court observes that the current use of deferred-prosecution agreements for corporations
rather than individual defendants strays from Congress’s intent when it created an exclusion
from the speedy trial calculation for the use of such agreements.”).
173. See generally USAM, supra note 25.
174. Id. § 9-22.100; Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 152, § 712.
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2008.175 The DOJ should incorporate some of the language regarding corpo-
rate deferrals from these sections into section 9-22.010, the section gov-
erning noncorporate deferrals.176 This section should be amended to
include, among the listed objectives of pretrial diversion, the goals of (1)
facilitating the rehabilitation of criminal defendants by minimizing the col-
lateral effects of criminal convictions and (2) reducing the collateral impact
of criminal convictions on third parties, including the families and commu-
nities of defendants. Furthermore, the DOJ should add an additional section
titled “Collateral Consequences,” which should explain the attendant harms
that might follow from noncorporate criminal convictions. Given that there
are over a thousand federal collateral consequences,177 this section should
not attempt to detail each one, but it should instead depict, in broad strokes,
categories of collateral consequences, similarly to the analogous subpart in
the corporate section.178 Most importantly, the section should explicitly de-
clare at the beginning, as section 9-28.1100 does, that “[p]rosecutors may
consider the collateral consequences of a . . . criminal conviction or indict-
ment in determining whether to charge the [defendant] with a criminal of-
fense and how to resolve . . . criminal cases.”179 Although the manual, as
currently written, does not prohibit prosecutors from considering these con-
sequences,180 an explicit directive to do so would likely promote compliance.
Alternatively, the DOJ could issue a memorandum to recommend that
prosecutors offer DPAs and NPAs to noncorporate defendants. Although the
manual contemplates diversion programs, prosecutors are not explicitly in-
structed to offer DPAs and NPAs to noncorporate defendants in order to
divert them.181 The DOJ has issued a series of memoranda in the past two
decades instructing prosecutors on charging corporate defendants. The first
of these memos was issued in 1999 by then–Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder.182 The Holder Memo failed to explicitly acknowledge DPAs and
NPAs as alternatives to prosecutors, and it did not provide parameters or
clear standards regarding diversion in corporate cases.183 It was not until a
later memo from then–Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson184 that
175. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines
for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/
2008/August/08-odag-757.html [https://perma.cc/T79V-FNFD].
176. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-22.010.
177. See generally NICCC, supra note 3.
178. See USAM, supra note 25, § 9-28.1100.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 9-22.010.
181. Id. § 9-22.100.
182. Holder Memo, supra note 149.
183. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1305.
184. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWC2-X2H8].
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the DOJ “explicitly recognized pre-trial diversion as a viable option to re-
ward a corporation’s authentic cooperation” that the use of DPAs began to
increase.185 If the DOJ issued a memorandum explicitly recommending the
use of pretrial diversion in noncorporate cases in addition to amending the
manual, prosecutors would likely heed the suggestion.
One potential problem with issuing these guidelines has to do with
scope—it would be both impractical and impossible for prosecutors to
meaningfully consider offering DPAs and NPAs to every defendant that they
encounter. The manual currently limits eligibility for pretrial diversion pro-
grams to any individual who is not:
(1) Accused of an offense which, under existing D[OJ] guidelines, should
be diverted to the State for prosecution; (2) A person with two or more
prior felony convictions; (3) A public official or former public official ac-
cused of an offense arising out of an alleged violation of a public trust; or
(4) Accused of an offense related to national security or foreign affairs.186
The first criterion is logical from a federalism perspective, and the third and
fourth are consistent with protecting government interests and ensuring na-
tional security, respectively. The second limitation, however, precludes a
large group of defendants from eligibility for diversion.187 Since certain sta-
tus offenses, such as felon-in-possession laws, are felonies,188 it can be easy
for individuals to accumulate several felony convictions in rapid succession.
Furthermore, limiting eligibility for diversion to individuals with only one
felony conviction echoes the sentiments behind three-strikes laws.189 There-
fore, the DOJ should expand the second criterion to include individuals who
have multiple felony convictions.
The use of deferred-prosecution agreements for individual,
noncorporate defendants would serve a rehabilitative function because these
agreements would give defendants second chances.190 Although scholars
most frequently reference retributivism and deterrence as the underlying
philosophical rationales supporting the imposition of criminal liability,191
185. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 6, at 1309.
186. USAM, supra note 25, § 9-22.100.
187. See, e.g., Thomas P. Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, NCJ 197976, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974–2001
(2003) (estimating that over 5.6 million adults had served time in prison between 1974 and
2001); Criminal Cases, Bureau Just. Stat., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=23
[https://perma.cc/PV7E-VTW7] (“More than three-fourths of felony defendants had a prior
arrest history, with 69% having multiple prior arrests.”). To the extent that this figure serves as
a reliable proxy for the prevalence of felony convictions among adults in the United States, it
supports the assertion that a significant number of individuals would be ineligible for diver-
sion on the basis of having been previously convicted of a felony.
188. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012).
189. E.g., Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(d) (2016) (requiring a twenty-five- to ninety-nine-
year sentence for a third felony conviction).
190. See Uhlmann, supra note 12, at 1306.
191. See, e.g., Thomas E. Robins, Retribution, the Evolving Standard of Decency, and Meth-
ods of Execution: The Inevitable Collision in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 119 Pa. St. L.
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rehabilitation is still an important purpose. Under a retributivist rationale,
punishment is justified because the offender has, by committing a crime,
breached his social contract and must repay a debt to society.192 Deterrence
theory, on the other hand, justifies punishment on more utilitarian
grounds—punishment is justified because it will either prevent the offender
from committing crimes in the future (specific deterrence),193 prevent other
potential offenders from committing crimes (general deterrence),194 or both.
But given that imprisonment in the United States has increased dramatically
in recent decades, perhaps an alternative approach to criminality should be
considered—that of rehabilitation.
Under a rehabilitative model, the criminal justice system does not seek
to punish or make examples of offenders. Rather, the function of the system
is to rehabilitate and reform these individuals so that they do not reoffend,
not out of a fear of punishment, but out of an improvement in their circum-
stances.195 The rehabilitative model recognizes the humanity of criminal de-
fendants in a way that traditional justifications of criminal law do not.196
Pretrial diversion programs, such as MCEP and Project Crossroads, sought
to rehabilitate their participants by providing them with vocational training,
counseling, and other services.197 It is no small wonder that these programs
were remarkably successful in helping participants improve their stations in
life.198 The imposition of severe, broad, and numerous collateral conse-
quences on defendants currently makes it extremely challenging for them to
live normal lives after conviction.199 Prosecutors should therefore give mean-
ingful consideration to these collateral consequences, and they should con-
sequently consider offering more DPAs and NPAs to noncorporate offenders
in order to give them opportunities to reform after offending. Such a prac-
tice would be most successful in achieving the rehabilitative goals of criminal
justice.
Rev. 885, 892 (2015) (“Retribution demands culpability before punishment and proportional-
ity in punishment. Retributivist justice relies solely on the moral justification that the guilty
require punishment, either for the benefit of the criminal and victim, or for society as a
whole.”).
192. See id.
193. See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1626
(1992).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1642 (“Rehabilitative theories view punishment as a means of reforming
criminals or therapeutically ‘curing’ them of the pathology that is believed to motivate their
offenses.”).
196. But see C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in Contemporary
Punishment: Views, Explanations, and Justifications 194, 194–95 (Rudolph J. Gerber &
Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) (arguing that the rehabilitative model actually fails to recog-
nize the humanity of defendants because it does not consider what he deserves but rather
considers what will cure him, thereby making him “a mere object, a patient, a ‘case.’ ”).
197. See generally Criminal Justice Coordination Council & Vera Inst. of Justice,
supra note 39; Rovner-Pieczenik, supra note 39.
198. See sources cited supra note 39.
199. See supra Section II.A.2 for a discussion of collateral consequences and hardship.
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An obvious limitation to these proposals is the fact that prosecutorial
discretion is largely unreviewable.200 Therefore, although this language may
be included in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and DOJ memos, and even repli-
cated at state and local levels, it may not necessarily be followed. Ultimately,
however, including such recommendations is better than not addressing
their viability at all. As an initial matter, a statement recognizing the impor-
tance of considering collateral consequences serves at least an expressive
function and shows that actors in the criminal justice system are committed
to treating defendants humanely. Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that
including this language would likely result in less frequent consideration of
collateral consequences for noncorporate defendants. Finally, the exercise of
discretion is necessarily bidirectional; it is possible that this modification will
inspire prosecutors to wield their power to offer DPAs and NPAs to
noncorporate defendants more frequently than they currently do.201 Broad,
DOJ-wide reform may be unavailable in the current political climate. Prose-
cutors should therefore exercise their discretion to offer DPAs and NPAs to
noncorporate individuals, even in the absence of an explicit departmental
policy, in the interest of justice.
B. Alternative Mitigation Methods
In the event that prosecutors continue to limit the use of DPAs and
NPAs to corporate cases, they should consider implementing alternative re-
forms to help minimize the long-lasting and far-reaching impact that crimi-
nal convictions may have on noncorporate defendants. As with DPAs and
NPAs, these alternative solutions would require actors in the criminal justice
system to think about defendants as humans and not merely as instruments
of criminality. These solutions also focus on rehabilitation, rather than retri-
bution or deterrence, and seek to help offenders reform, rather than repay.
Robust expungement procedures could significantly allay the devastat-
ing effects of criminal convictions for individual defendants. Expungement
is defined as “[t]he removal of a conviction (esp[ecially] for a first offense)
from a person’s criminal record.”202 The practice is authorized by statutes,
varies from state to state, and is not often available.203 It provides defendants
with numerous benefits, however, by allowing them to erase the mistakes of
the past and start over. A defendant who has successfully expunged his crim-
inal conviction would not be limited in his abilities to apply for jobs, hold
professional licenses, qualify for federal assistance, and live in public hous-
ing. Indiana, for example, recently amended its expungement laws to allow
individuals with misdemeanor convictions to petition for expungement five
200. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 1, at 437–38.
201. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 Am. J. Comp. L.
532, 535–36 (1970) (“The discretionary power to be lenient is an impossibility without a
concomitant discretionary power not to be lenient . . . .”).
202. Expungement of Record, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
203. See Pinard, supra note 24, at 505.
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years after conviction,204 individuals with nonviolent felony convictions to
petition for expungement either eight years after conviction or three years
after release,205 and individuals with serious felonies to petition for expunge-
ment either ten years after conviction or five years after release.206 These
provisions may serve as models for other states or the federal government to
adopt similar procedures. Indiana’s statute is particularly notable in that it
prohibits discrimination on the basis of expunged records and provides that
defendants may not waive their expungement rights in plea bargains.207
These limitations offer additional protections to defendants and ensure that
they will fully benefit from expungement.
Reentry programs may also help released inmates overcome some of the
barriers they will likely face upon returning to their communities. Although
the federal criminal justice system abolished parole in the 1980s,208 it is pos-
sible for defendants to receive combined sentences of incarceration followed
by supervised release.209 Federal inmates may also be eligible for supervised
release on the basis of good time credit, which typically results in a 15%
reduction of the time they spend in prison.210 Some states have adopted re-
entry programs that provide services and supervision to inmates upon re-
lease; these states have seen some success in the form of diminished
recidivism and crime rates.211 The federal system could develop similar back-
end diversion programs that would provide inmates with resources to assist
them upon release. Given that these individuals have been separated from
society for long periods of time and will be subject to numerous debilitating
regulations upon reentry, it seems illogical not to provide them with such
assistance. Programs that offer vocational support would be particularly
helpful, as would programs that offer treatment for drug and alcohol abuse.
While these programs would not completely avoid subjecting defendants to
collateral consequences, they could at least offer them the tools necessary to
overcome the obstacles such consequences impose.
204. Ind. Code § 35-38-9-2 (2016).
205. Id. § 35-38-9-4.
206. Id. § 35-38-9-5. Indiana does not allow for expungement of the records of individu-
als who have been convicted of official misconduct, kidnapping, human trafficking, homicide,
or sex crimes. Id. § 35-38-9-5(b).
207. Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law,
90 Ind. L.J. 1321, 1343 (2015).
208. Osler & Bennett, supra note 2, at 129. States differ in their provisions of parole and
supervised release; this Note will focus on the federal system, for consistency.
209. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.4d (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015).
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012).
211. See, e.g., Mich. Prisoner ReEntry Initiative, 2010 Progress Report 15 (2010),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/MPRI_2010_Progress_Report_343664_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62NP-XBCB] (noting that the number of parolees returning to prison
within three years fell from one in two to one in three since the advent of the MPRI, that the
prison populations in Michigan is (safely) at its lowest level since 1999, and that the number of
serious crimes decreased by about 50,000 between 2006 and 2009).
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Recent years have also seen the advent of problem-solving courts, such
as drug courts and therapeutic courts. “Problem-solving courts abandon the
traditional model of adjudicating guilt or innocence. Instead, the courts as-
sume guilt and focus on rehabilitation, seeking to address and resolve the
underlying cause of the criminal activity . . . .”212 Drug courts, for example,
are characterized by diversion, treatment, a nonadversarial approach, and
ongoing judicial supervision.213 Upon successful completion of treatment,
defendants graduate, after which their records may even be sealed.214 An-
other alternative proposal to help mitigate the effects of convictions is to
allow all graduates from drug and therapeutic courts to have their records
sealed, not only those who have not committed felony offenses. Ultimately,
even if participants do not qualify to have their records sealed, they are ar-
guably rehabilitated, at least with respect to their addictions. These partici-
pants are therefore less likely to commit drug-related offenses again.
While these alternative solutions may help mitigate the problems that
criminal defendants face after conviction, the most effective solution would
be one that works to reduce conviction rates in the first place. Prosecutors
possess a great deal of power in our criminal justice system, and they should
use this power to help defendants reform, not just to make them pay for
their transgressions. Ideally, prosecutors will turn to DPAs and NPAs in the
noncorporate context to help them achieve there what they have managed to
achieve with corporations: decreased collateral devastation.
Conclusion
The criminal justice system in the United States is cyclical. By imposing
harsh collateral consequences on convicted defendants, the system essen-
tially ensures that these individuals will have little to no chance of ever lead-
ing normal lives after conviction. It should come as no surprise, then, that
approximately two-thirds of released individuals are rearrested within three
years.215 Although prosecutors readily defer the prosecution of corporate de-
fendants, they do not offer the same option to noncorporate defendants at
nearly the same rate. This notable disparity in treatment serves to increase
the racial and socioeconomic stratification that is rampant in the system by
ensuring that wealthy, usually white, corporate defendants are not subjected
to criminal convictions or any of their attendant consequences, while con-
tinuing to subject minority defendants with little bargaining power to the
criminal process. In order to correct this inequality, prosecutors should seek
to understand all of the defendants they encounter in terms of their human-
ity. While prosecutors already consider corporate personhood in deciding to
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The Criminal Costs of Treatment and the Case for Reform 15 (2009), https://
www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20217&libID=20187 [https://perma.cc/
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defer prosecutions of corporate defendants, they should give similar consid-
eration to the personhood of noncorporate defendants. With an eye toward
avoiding the devastating fallout that collateral consequences of criminal con-
victions often impose on noncorporate defendants, prosecutors should offer
more deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution agreements to these
individuals.
